Abstract-In this paper, we derive team and person-byperson optimality conditions for distributed differential decision systems with different or decentralized information structures. The necessary conditions of optimality are given in terms of Hamiltonian system of equations consisting of a coupled backward and forward differential equations and a Hamiltonian projected onto the subspace generated by the decentralized information structures. Under certain global convexity conditions it is shown that the optimality conitions are also sufficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
When the system model consists of multiple decision makers, and the acquisition of information and its processing is decentralized or shared among several locations, the decision makers actions are based on different information. We call the information available for such decisions, "decentralized information structures or patterns". When the system model is dynamic, consisting of an interconnection of at least two subsystems, and the decisions are based on decentralized information structures, we call the overall system a "distributed system with decentralized information structures".
Over the years several specific forms of decentralized information structures are analyzed mostly in discrete-time (see, for example [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] for the most recent approaches). However, at this stage the systematic framework addressing optimality conditions for distributed systems with decentralized information structures is [6] , [7] , where necessary and sufficient team game optimality conditions are given for distributed stochastic differential systems with decentralized information structures.
In this paper, we draw the corresponding results for deterministic continuous-and discrete-time systems with decentralized information structures. More specifically, we consider a team game reward (e.g., [8] , [9] , [10] ) and we apply concepts from the classical theory of optimization to derive necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for nonlinear distributed systems with decentralized information structures. The optimality conditions developed in this paper can be applied to many architectures of distributed systems (see, for example, Fig. 1 ). The specific contributions of this paper are the following. In Section II the notation used throughout the paper is provided, along with some background on team games and information structures that is needed for our subsequent development. In Section III, we first introduce the formulation of the team and person-by-person decision problems of differential systems, and then we derive the optimality conditions. In Section IV, we compute the optimal strategies for specific pay-off and differential structures and in Section V, we provide the equivalent formulation for discretetime dynamical systems.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
The sets of real, integer and natural numbers are denoted by R, Z and N, respectively; Z N = {1, 2, . . . , N } and
and the linear transformation mapping of a vector space X into a vector space Y is denoted by L(X , Y). a, b represents the inner product in R n , ∀a, b ∈ R n for some positive integer n, whereas |a| R n = a, b is the norm on R n , ∀a ∈ R n for some positive integer n. H = M M ⊥ is a direct sum representation of a Hilbert space H, where M is a closed subspace of H and M ⊥ its orthogonal complement. Π M (x) is the orthogonal projection of a Hilbert space element x ∈ H onto the subspace M ⊂ H.
Our derivations will make use of the following spaces. tions φ we have the following spaces:
III. TEAM GAMES OF DIFFERENTIAL SYSTEMS
We first introduce the mathematical formulation of the team and person-by-person (PbP) decision problems of differential systems, and then we derive the optimality conditions. We invoke decision maker (DM) strategies which are deterministic measurable functions, also known as regular strategies.
A. Elements of Team Games
The basic elements of a team game are the state space, the observation space, the DMs action spaces, and the pay-off. These are described below.
Unobserved State Space
The unobserved state space is assumed to be a linear complete separable metric space ( 
is the σ−field generated by cylinder sets in C([0, T ], R n ), and a state trajectory is
We also introduce σ−field generated by truncations of
Thus,
Thus, for continuous trajectories the space C([0, T ], R n ) represent the unobserved state space, and its elements the unobserved state trajectories.
Observation Space
The observation space is assume to be a linear complete separable metric space (Y 
such that {h 
. . , N . Note that the above constructions also embeds as a special case observation trajectories which are independent of x, by setting y
Team Members
The team is assumed to consist of N Decision Makers (DM) or players whose actions {u 
denote the family of σ−fields generated by truncations of
Clearly,
. . , N . The set of admissible N team or person-by-person strategies is denoted by
Clearly, open loop strategies can be described via observations {y i (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} which belong to closed subspaces generated by finite number of basis, H 
Distributed Differential System
A distributed differential system consists of an interconnec- 1 We often write L 2
tion of N subsystems. Each subsystem i has its own state vector R ni , action space A i ⊂ R di , and an initial state vector
0 , described by a system of coupled differential equations as follows.
Define the augmented vectors by
In compact form the distributed differential system is described bẏ
where (5) is very general since no specific interconnection structure is assumed among the different subsystems.
Pay-off Functional
Consider the distributed system (5) with a given admissible set of DMs strategies. Given a u ∈ U (N ) reg [0, T ], we define the reward or performance criterion by
where
Notice that the performance of the decentralized system is measured by a single pay-off functional. The underlying assumption concerning the single pay-off instead of multiple pay-offs (one for each decision maker) is that the team objective can be met.
Team and Person-by-Person Optimality
Given the basic elements of the team game introduce above, we now introduce the definitions of team and Person-by-Person (PbP) or (player-by-player) optimality. (7) is called an optimal regular decision strategy (or control) and the corresponding x o (·) ≡ x(·; u o (·)) (satisfying (5)) the optimal state process. (PbP): Person-by-Person Optimality. Given the pay-off functional (6), constraint (5) the N tuple of strategies (8) are analogous to the Nash equilibrium strategies of team games consisting of a single pay-off and N DM. The rationale for the restriction to PbP optimal strategy is based on the fact that the actions of the N DM are not communicated to each other, and hence they cannot do better than restricting attention to this optimal strategy.
B. Existence of Solutions and Continuous Dependence
Herein, we study the question of existence of solutions to (5) and its continuous dependence on the DM strategies based on the following assumptions.
Assumptions 1: The drift f associated with (5) is a Borel measurable map defined by 
2) The solution of system (5) is continuously dependent on the DM strategies, in the sense that, as
C. Team and PbP Optimality Conditions
For the derivation of optimality conditions we shall require stronger regularity conditions for f , as well as, for the running and terminal pay-offs functions { , ϕ}. These are given below.
Assumptions 2: The maps of {f, , ϕ} satisfy the following conditions. (B1) The map f : [0, T ]×R n ×A (N ) −→ R n is continuous in (t, x, u) and continously differentiable with respect to x, u; (B2) The first derivatives of {f x , f u } are bounded uniformly
is Borel measurable, continuously differentiable with respect to (x, u), the map ϕ : [0, T ] × R n −→ (−∞, ∞] is continously differentiable with respect to x, (0, 0, t) is bounded, and there exist K 1 , K 2 > 0 such that
First, we derive necessary conditions for team and PbP optimality. For this derivation, we need the so-called variational equation. We note that for differential systems, the strategies can be either open-loop or feedback, and feedback strategies do not give smaller pay-off. Thus, the minimum pay-off attainable under open loop strategies is equal to the minimum pay-off attainable under feedback strategies. This is well known in deterministic optimal control theory. The point to be made is that when considering variations in the state trajectory the DM strategies do not react so we do not need to introduce derivatives of the u variable with respect to the state.
Suppose
denote the solutions of the system equation (5) corresponding to u ε (·) and u o (·), respectively. Consider the limit
We have the following result characterizing the variational equation.
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumptions 2 hold and consider strategies U (N ) (9) is an element of the Banach space B ∞ ([0, T ], R n ) and it is the unique solution of the variational differential equatioṅ
Before we show the optimality conditions we define the Hamiltonian system of equations, i.e.,
given by
For any u ∈ U (N )
In terms of the Hamiltonian, the state process satisfies the differential equatioṅ 
3 
0,t , by substituting the above decomposition in (13) we obtain
Let t ∈ (0, T ), and ε > 0, and consider the set
Clearly, it follows from the above construction that
Substituting (16) in (15) we obtain the following inequality
Letting |I ε | denote the Lebesgue measure of the set I ε and dividing the above expression by |I ε | and letting ε → 0 we arrive at the following inequality.
To complete the proof of 3) for a given
Then g i (t) ∈ H y i 0,t . We shall show that
Suppose for some i ∈ Z N , (20) does not hold, and let 
is team optimal if it satisfies (14). In other words, necessary conditions are also sufficient.
reg [0, T ] denote a candidate for the optimal team decision and u ∈ U (N )
By the convexity of ϕ(·), we have
. (22) Substituting (22) into (21) yields
Applying the differential rule to ψ o , x − x o on the interval [0, T ] we obtain the following equation.
Note that
By hypothesis of convexity of H in (x, u) ∈ R n × A (N ) , then (25) reduces to
where the last inequality follows from (14). This proves that u o optimal and hence the necessary conditions are also sufficient.
Under the conditions of Theorem 1, it can be shown that the necessary conditions for team optimality and PbP optimality are equivalent. Moreover, under the conditions of Theorem 2 it can be shown that PbP optimality implies team optimality. We state the results as a corollary.
Corollary 1: (Necessary and sufficient conditions for PbP optimality). Consider the PbP optimality of Problem 1 under the conditions of Theorem 1, 2. The necessary and sufficient conditions for PbP optimality of (u o (·), x o (·)) are those of team optimality given in Theorems 1, 2 with the variational inequality (13) replaced by
(27) Proof: Similar to that of Theorems 1 and 2. We conclude this section by stating that the team optimality conditions, Pontryagin's maximum principle are obtained following the classical theory of deterministic optimal control with centralized strategies. The only variation is the characterization of the optimal strategies described by the projection of the Hamiltonian onto the Hilbert space closed subspace generated by the observables (on which the different DM actions are based on). Consequently, we state following observations. (O1): By considering spike or needle variations, condition, the derivatives of f and w.r.t. u can be removed and replaced by f, , ϕ that are twice differentiable in x ∈ R n , having first partial derivatives which are measurable in t ∈ [0, T ] and continuous with respect to the rest of the arguments, and second partial derivatives which are uniformly bounded. (O2): The team and PbP optimality conditions of Theorem 1, 2 are based on the assumption that A i , i = 1, . . . , N are convex. We can consider relaxed strategies, that is, controls which are conditional distributions, u i t (dξ|{y i (s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}), i = 1, . . . , N , and remove the assumptions on the differentiability of f, with respect to u, and instead assume A i , i = 1, . . . , N are compact subsets of finite-dimensional spaces. Based on this relaxed strategies formulation we can show existence of optimal strategies utilizing appropriate weak * topologies. Such relaxed strategies are important when the DM actions are based on a finite number of points, such as, A i = {−1, +1} which is not a convex set. (O3): The team and PbP optimality conditions of Theorem 1, 2 can be generalized to include pointwise and integral constraints, of x, u involving inequalities and equalities. Moreover, the terminal time can be free laying on a manifold, and hence subject to optimization rather than been fixed T . Such problems are extensively investigated in the theory of optimal control. Some of these problems can be transformed into the team and PbP problems investigated earlier, by augmenting the Hamiltonian, and motifying the boundary conditions.
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we give examples for two team games with special structures, namely, Generalized Normal Form (GNF) and Linear Quadratic Form (LQF).
A. Generalized Normal Form (GNF)
Definition 1 (Generalized Normal Form): The game is said to have "general normal form" if
and R(·, ·) is symmetric uniformly positive definite, and λ(·, ·) is uniformly positive semidefinite. GNF refers to the case when the drift coefficient f is linear with respect to (w.r.t.) the decision variable u, and the pay-off function is quadratic in u, while f, , ϕ are nonlinear with respect to x.
By the definition of Hamiltonian (11), its derivative is given by
By Theorem 1, utilizing the fact that u i,o t ∈ H y i 0,t for each i ∈ Z N , the explicit expression for u i,o t is given by
B. Linear Quadratic Form (LQF)
Definition 2 (Quadratic Form): The game is said to have "linear quadratic form" if
and R(·) is symmetric uniformly positive definite, H(·) is symmetric uniformly positive semidefinite, and M (T ) is symmetric positive semidefinite. From the optimal strategies under LQF, one obtains for i = 1, 2, . . . , N :
Note that the previous equations can be put in the form of fixed point matrix equation. 1) Team games of Linear Quadratic Form -Explicit Expressions of Adjoint Processes: This is a necessary step before one proceeds with the computation of the explicit form of the optimal decentralized strategies, or the computation of them via fixed point methods. For a game of LQF, let (x o (·), ψ o (·)) denote the solutions of the Hamiltonian system, corresponding to the optimal control u o , then
Next, we find the form of the solution of the adjoint equation (30). Let {Φ(t, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T } denote the transition operator of A(·) and Φ * (·, ·) that of the adjoint A * (·) of A(·). Then we have the identity
One can verify by differentiation that the solution {ψ o (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} of (30), is given by
Since for any control policy, {x o (s) : 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T } is uniquely determined from (29) and its current value x o (t), then (31) can be expressed via
where Σ(·), β o (·) determine the operators to the one expressed via (31). Next, we determine the operators (Σ(·), β o (·)). Differentiating both sides of (32) and using (29), (30) yieldṡ
,
and matrices by 
where Σ(·), β o (·) are given by (33), (34) with b, F, E = 0. The optimal decisions {(u 
One can proceed further to utilize the solution for ψ o (·) to express the projections in (41a), (41b) into projections of the state x o (·) onto the subspaces H y i 0,t , i = 1, 2, and then find the equations governing these projections. This procedure is lenghty and hence it is omitted.
V. DISCRETE-TIME DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
By either discretizing the continuous-time system (or considering the discrete-time analog), we have the Hamiltonian at each time step k given by H(k, x, ψ, u) = f (k, x, u), ψ(k + 1) + (k, x, u), where k ∈ Z 0 T −1 and T is a positive integer. Note that the adjoint is one step ahead of the other terms. In terms of the Hamiltonian, the state process satisfies the differential equation
For any u ∈ U 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK In this paper we have considered team games for distributed decision systems, with decentralized information patterns for each DM. Necessary and sufficient optimality conditions with respect to team optimality and PbP optimality criteria are derived, based on Pontryagin's maximum principle. The methodology is very general, and applicable to many areas. However, several additional issues remain to be investigated. Below, we provide a short list. (F1) The derivation of optimality conditions can be used in other type of games such as Nash-equilibrium games with decentralized information structures for each DM, and minimax games of robust control. (F2) The methodology can be extended to deal with exogenous inputs in the state dynamics and the measurements, by assuming these belong to L 2 or 2 spaces. For distributed systems of control of linear quadratic form, with decentralized information structures, one may also invoke the minimax formulation found in [11] which invokes Krein spaces, instead of Hilbert spaces.
